

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 01656 041338Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----117502 041343Z /50
O 041030Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0907

S E C R E T ANKARA 1656

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR NIMETZ AND VEST

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, TU, GR,US
SUBJ: CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF DEFENSE COOPERATION

1. WE FACE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS IN MEETING THE
POLITICAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE SECRETARY BE ABLE
TO TESTIFY THAT HIS SUPPORT FOR THE DCA TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
EXISTENCE OF REASONABLE NEW TURKISH NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS
FOR CYPRUS. WE HAVE LOOKED AT THREE POSSIBLE ALTER-
NATIVES FOR MEETING THIS REQUIREMENT:

(A) START THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BEFORE APRIL 4
HEARINGS, THE PROPOSALS TO BE PUBLICIZED SOON AFTER
THE TALKS BEGIN; (B) THE TURKS GIVE THE GIST OF THEIR
PROPOSALS TO WALDHEIM, NOT IN MID-MARCH AS PLANNED, BUT
IN LATE MARCH, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY MAKE THEM PUBLIC;
(C) THE TURKS GIVE THEIR PROPOSALS TO WALDHEIM IN LATE
MARCH AND BRIEF THEIR PRINCIPAL NATO ALLIES
AND THE EEC PRESIDENCY SIMULTANEOUSLY; THE
SECRETARY COULD THEN TESTIFY IN THE LIGHT OF
THIS CLASSIFIED BRIEFING.

2. THIS IS HOW WE ASSESS THE THREE ALTERNATIVES:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 01656 041338Z

A. PUBLICIZING THROUGH INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS
(1) WE DOUBT THAT THE GREEK SIDE WOULD AGREE--
DESPITE WHATEVER OUTSIDE PRESSURE CAN BE APPLIED--
TO START TALKS OR TO ACCEPT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS
AS NEGOTIABLE IF BY DOING SO THEY WOULD ENHANCE
PROSPECT FOR APPROVAL OF THE DCA FOR TURKEY. IF
TALKS ARE STARTED IN MARCH, WITH ALL PARTIES AWARE

THAT HEARINGS WILL BEGIN IN APRIL, THERE IS A VERY HIGH RISK THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WILL BE DENOUNCED AND REJECTED AND THE TALKS WILL BE PREJUDICED--IF, IN FACT, THEY ARE EVER ALLOWED TO GET STARTED.

(2) THE FURTHER RESULT WOULD BE THAT THE SECRETARY, IN HIS APPEARANCE BEFORE THE HAMILTON SUBCOMMITTEE, WOULD BE CHARACTERIZING PROPOSALS IN A POSITIVE LIGHT WHEN THEY HAVE ALREADY BEEN DENOUNCED BY THE GREEK SIDE. HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ON GREECE'S PROPONENTS DIRECTLY AND AT A DISADVANTAGE IN A MORE THAN NECESSARILY BITTER ATMOSPHERE, AND AT THE SAME TIME WOULD COME INTO A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE EXPRESSED VIEWS OF THE GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS.

(3) THE SECRETARY MIGHT NONETHELESS WIN HIS CASE WITH CONGRESS. HE COULD MAKE THE POINT THAT THE GREEK OPPOSITION TO TURKISH PROPOSALS THAT ARE IN OUR ASSESSMENT CLEARLY NEGOTIABLE RAISES THE IMPLICATION THAT THE GREEK SIDE WANTS THE EMBARGO AGAINST TURKEY MORE THAN IT WANTS A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. HE WOULD ARGUE THAT TURKEY HAS DONE ALL THAT COULD BE EXPECTED BY PRESENTING THE PROPOSALS, AND THAT THE US MUST FOLLOW ITS OWN INTERESTS BY RATIFYING THE DCA.

(4) THE BEST RESULT WE FORESEE FROM THIS ALTERNATIVE, HOWEVER, WOULD BE THE PASSAGE OF THE DCA
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 01656 041338Z

AT A HIGH COST IN CONGRESSIONAL ACRIMONY AND IN EXTRA STRAIN ON OUR RELATIONS WITH GREECE, WHILE A PROMISING CHANCE TO SETTLE CYPRUS WOULD BE ABORTED.

B. DIRECTLY PUBLICIZING

(1) IF THE PROPOSALS WERE MADE PUBLIC FAR ENOUGH BEFORE THE HEARINGS THAT THE GREEK SIDE HAS TIME TO DENOUNCE THEM, THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD POSE THE SAME RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES AS THE PREVIOUS ONE.

(2) IF PUBLICIZING WERE DELAYED UNTIL APRIL 3, HOWEVER, THE GREEK SIDE COULD NOT PUT TOGETHER A VERY STRONG CASE IN TIME TO AFFECT THE APRIL 4 HEARINGS. BUT THEY COULD PRODUCE A DENUNCIATION IN TIME FOR ANY LATER HEARINGS OR FOR THE HOUSE VOTE.

(3) THE SECRETARY AND THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS WOULD HAVE THE TEXT BEFORE THEM AND COULD DISCUSS IT--WHICH COULD BE, ON BALANCE, AN ADVANTAGE IF THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ARE GOOD ENOUGH.

(4) THE GOT MIGHT WELL BE UNWILLING TO PUBLICIZE ITS PROPOSALS, WHICH IT HAS DEVELOPED FOR USE IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT MIGHT ALSO BE UNWILLING TO EXPOSE ITSELF TO CRITICISM FOR COOPERATING IN A

PROCEDURE THAT IMPLIES THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE DCA AND CYPRUS.

(5) THE CHANCE THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS COULD THEN BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY REDUCED.

C. TESTIMONY ON BASIS OF CLASSIFIED BRIEFING

(1) THE SECRETARY WOULD TELL THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT HE COULD NOT DISCLOSE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSALS BECAUSE BY DOING SO HE WOULD VIOLATE THE CONFIDENTIALITY NECESSARY FOR THE UPCOMING TALKS, NOR COULD HE EITHER ENDORSE OR CRITICIZE THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WITHOUT ENDANGERING THE SUCCESS OF THE TALKS. HOWEVER, HE COULD SAY THAT AS AN EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR, HE REGARDED THE PROPOSALS AS OFFERING A BASIS FOR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 ANKARA 01656 041338Z

NEGOTIATION. HE COULD GO ON TO SAY THAT THE US COULD NOT AND SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND THAT POSITION WITHOUT BECOMING EITHER ONE-SIDED OR AN ACTUAL PARTY TO THE DISPUTE. HE COULD THEN PROCEED TO MAKE THE CASE FOR APPROVAL OF THE DCA. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THIS IS THE BEST POSSIBLE LINE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO TAKE IN WHAT WILL BE A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION.

(2) THE TURKS MIGHT NOT WANT TO GO ALONG WITH THIS PROCEDURE FOR THE SAME REASONS MENTIONED IN DISCUSSING THE PREVIOUS ALTERNATIVE.

(3) THE BRIEFINGS COULD LEAK TO THE GREEKS, WHO COULD THEN MOUNT AN ATTACK. HOWEVER, THEY PROBABLY WOULD BE ON WEAKER GROUND THAN IN THE SITUATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE OTHER ALTERNATIVES.

(4) CONGRESSIONAL PROPONENTS OF THE EMBARGO COULD TRY TO BLOCK CONSIDERATION UNTIL THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ARE PUBLIC.

(5) THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE FIRST HEARING AND THE VOTE WOULD STILL OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR MISCHIEF-MAKING.

(6) THE USEFULNESS OF THE TURKISH PROPOSALS AS A BASIS FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD STILL BE IN JEOPARDY, BUT LESS THAN IF THEY WERE PUT UP PUBLICLY AS A TARGET FOR DENOUNCIATION.

3. I BELIEVE THAT THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE IS CLEARLY PREFERABLE. IF DEPARTMENT CONCURS, I RECOMMEND THAT I BE INSTRUCTED TO CONSULT WITH ELEKDAG OR ECEVIT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR WORKING TOGETHER ALONG THESE LINES.
SPIERS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, CAT-A, CHEROKEE 3-4-78, US CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978ANKARA01656
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: FOR NIMETZ AND VEST
Executive Order: OA
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P850101-2137, P780026-1907
Format: TEL
From: ANKARA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803106/aaaadmmd.tel
Line Count: 167
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 5a507bb8-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3117507
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF DEFENSE COOPERATION
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, PBOR, TU, GR, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/5a507bb8-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014